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Abstract
This thesis observes the phenomenon of online censorship, both from blocking and
mitigation perspectives. It enumerates and characterizes typical methods and types
of Internet censorship, as well as effective circumvention solutions and strategies.
Additionally, the study provides detailed observations of the Great Firewall, the
ultimate weapon of a Chinese censor, and the Tor anonymity network, the broadly
recognized anti-censorship and anti-surveillance tool. Furthermore, it illuminates the
Tor network blocking and the firewall’s scanning engine (active probing), which is
used to detect mitigating servers. The results of the study indicate that 1) The Tor
network is heavily suppressed in China; 2) Active probing technique still contributes
to blocking decisions; and 3) The Great Firewall successfully engages blocking against
obfs4 Tor bridges. Finally, the work suggests a solution for bypassing the Great
Firewall using a traffic engineering approach, i.e., software-defined networking and
the well-known port knocking technique.
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1 Introduction
Over the past decade, internet censorship circumvention has been the subject of
growing interest due to pervasive restriction practices used by numerous states. It
is well known that China is the country with the most severe internet censorship.
Chinese internet restrictions started with the development of the Great Firewall
(GFW) in 1996 [1]. Nowadays, the firewall restricts access to many popular internet
services, including Facebook and Google. The GFW is known to be the most
sophisticated network censorship solution in the world. However, the GFW is not
perfect, which makes it possible to bypass the restrictions.
In recent years, many efforts have been devoted to investigating GFW operations
and developing countermeasures. It was shown that the firewall relies on almost
all known network filtering techniques [1]. Moreover, the usage of reactive network
scanning, known as active probing, has been detected and shown to be used by
GFW against Tor and other anti-censorship tools[2, 3, 4]. It was recently reported
that the firewall had started complete blocking of some encrypted connections
regardless of their purpose [5]. Nevertheless, numerous anti-censorship solutions and
protocols have been developed by both the academic community and business. Some
notable examples include domain fronting[6], which is actively used by Tor; MTProto
protocol from Telegram [7]; Shadowsocks[8]; and Lampshade [9]. Unfortunately, the
continuous censorship arms race increasingly challenges current solutions. Recent
advances in machine learning have allowed detecting Shadowsocks traffic with about
90% probability[10]. Researchers from the University of Colorado have demonstrated
the detection of five popular anti-censorship solutions by observing their network
behavior [11].
Existing anti-censorship tools make the Chinese censorship strategy ineffective by
relying on possible high collateral damage connected with blocking or by obfuscating
and hiding communications using an out-of-band delivered secret. The first strategy
is implemented by domain fronting and is used in Tor meek transport, while the
second strategy is inherited by Shadowsocks, obfs4, and many other anti-censorship
tools. However, domain fronting is expensive to operate since it relies on third-party
infrastructure. Collateral damage might be acceptable to the censor, as occurred
during the recent Belarussian Internet shutdown. The problem with dedicated anti-
censorship protocols lies in their exclusive circumvention purpose. Usage of pervasive
obfuscation and encryption differentiates their traffic patterns from general-purpose
protocols, and makes them suspicious in the eyes of a censor. This significantly
facilitates circumvention detection [11].
The GFW relies on active probing, a specially constructed forge connection
request, to identify circumvention servers. Numerous anti-censorship solutions avoid
active probing by using an out-of-band delivered secret in order to encrypt connections.
However, these solutions all operate on an application level and do not attempt to
identify probing on a lower network level.
A promising strategy to identify GFW probes would be to send a specially
constructed packet (i.e., a knock packet) from a censored PC to a circumvention
infrastructure, thus facilitating censorship bypass for several traditional protocols.
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This packet reliably identifies the legitimate client address, whereas all other addresses
should be considered as probe sources and treated accordingly. The suggested strategy
would ensure better censorship penetration for a broader number of tunneling and
proxy protocols.
This study aims to demonstrate how the GFW blocks Tor, observe GFW’s
scanning (probing) activities, design a method for identifying and blocking the
observed GFW probes, and evaluate the method’s effectiveness in terms of bypassing
censorship. To achieve these objectives, the tor bridge’s circumvention performance
will be evaluated and compared before and after the proposed method’s deployment.
This work will only focus on active probing. Other filtering techniques are excluded
from the scope due to their well-defined effectiveness and well-known bypassing
methods.
The rest of this thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 2 reviews online
censorship in general. The Great Firewall and the Tor anonymity network are
discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. Chapter 5 demonstrates the Tor network reachability
from mainland China. Chapter 6 presents an examination of the GFW probing
activities observed in this work. Chapter 7 introduces a method for identifying
and blocking the GFW probes and demonstrates the effectiveness of the suggested
method. A conclusion, possibilities for future studies, and some limitations are
discussed in Chapter 8.
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2 Internet censorship
The Internet has fundamentally changed every aspect of people’s lives and has become
a modern world engine. In 2020, the top five world biggest companies by market
value are Microsoft, Apple, Amazon, Alphabet (Google), and Facebook[12]. This
list radically illustrates the importance of the global network to our economy and
society. This transformation happened because of the content and services that are
available on the Internet. Eventually, free borderless content distribution became
the foundation of the welfare of the entire world.
However, the Internet contains some content that regulators, lawmakers, and
officials would like to block. The content might be restricted based on the user’s age
or location using various online censorship methods. The incentives for censorship are
diverse and include preventing infringement of intellectual property rights, stopping
the spread of child abuse materials, countering illegal activities on the Internet, and
protecting national security[13].
When talking about Internet censorship, the words blocking, filtering, and cen-
sorship and equally treated regardless of their connotation. Although the word
"censorship" has a strong negative meaning, whereas "filtering" sounds more innocent
and harmless. This study observes internet censorship from a technical perspective
and discusses blocking and filtering of online content regardless of censors’ motives
and reasons. However, some types of censorship are presented in the upcoming
section, with the goal to provide a broader view of the studied question.
2.1 Types of online censorship
Public authorities restrict access to information and related services that are illegal
in a particular jurisdiction, considered a threat to public welfare, or unacceptable to
any audience. Furthermore, private and public companies imply blocking based on
their network security policies and codes of conduct. Copyright holders use legislative
instruments to remove piracy content from a search engine output and hosting
services. Additionally, political and ideological censorship represents a different
type of censorship because of its significance. Although this type of censorship
might be merged with illegal content blocking if not to consider its political nature.
Nevertheless, three types of censorship are enumerated; these include:
– Harmful and illegal content blocking
– Business censorship
– Political and ideological censorship
2.1.1 Harmful and Illegal content blocking
The specifics of the local legal environment have an impact on content blocking.
Content blocking usually occurs if it violates intellectual property laws, considered a
threat to national security, or banned for cultural or political reasons[13]. One of the
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difficulties, which force the authorities of individual countries to utilize censorship
measures, comes from the differences in the legislative definition of illegal (harmful)
content by different states.
For example, European digital single market legislation defines categories of illegal
and harmful content, such as terrorist content, xenophobic or racist speech, child
sexual abuse material, infringements of intellectual property rights, commercial scams,
and frauds[14]. Another example demonstrates the definition of harmful content
from the United Kingdom parliament. This list is more detailed than European
classification and, in addition to the above categories, adds such items as immigration
crime, modern slavery, promotion of Female Genital Mutilation (FGW), encouraging
or assisting suicide, and disinformation[15]. United States legislation, such as the
Stop Advertising Victims of Exploitation Act (SAVE) [16] and Children’s Internet
Protection Act (CIPA)[17], defines almost similar categories of harmful and illegal
data as European and UK documents. In addition to some previously mentioned
content categories, Russia labels information related to narcotics, suicides, and the
promotion of homosexual relations as harmful and illegal[18].
These examples not only show that the meaning of Illegal content varies from
country to country but also separate categories that are globally recognized by most
countries as harmful and illegal, including three universal and significant categories:
– Terrorist content
– Child sexual abuse material
– Infringements of intellectual property rights
These three categories are further observed from the European legislative process’s
position and based on the European Commission’s documents. For instance, Article
21 of the EU directive 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15
March 2017 on combating terrorism [19] states that EU Member States shall take the
necessary measures, such as content removal or blocking, to prevent the distribution
of online materials with the intent or a provocation of a terrorist offense.
Europe’s directive 2011/92/EU on combating the sexual abuse and sexual ex-
ploitation of children and child pornography [20] aims to protect children from sexual
abuse behavior and deny access to child abuse materials. Article 21 of the directive
empowers Member States to take measures against the dissemination of material
related by the directive as child abuse content. Furthermore, the directive establishes
grounds to prosecute owners and distributors of child abuse materials, and censorship
acts as a tool in this process with the goal to protect children.
Controversial EU directive 2019/790 on copyright and related rights in the Digital
Single Market [21] forces online content-sharing service to remove unauthorized
materials and establishes liability for them if content platforms fail to remove unau-
thorized materials and demonstrate that they have done their best to prevent the
future uploading of specific unauthorized works. Thus, content providers in Europe
are obligated to establish self-censorship to prevent the uploading of unauthorized
content. The directive raised a hot discussion both in the European parliament
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and society. On 26 March 2019, the directive was approved by 349 deputies. Two
hundred seventy-four parliament members voted against the directive. After the vote,
Finland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, and Polland issued a joint statement
that noted that the directive fails to maintain the right balance between copyright
holders’ protection and the interest of society and business[22].
The last example demonstrates how controversial and ambiguous can be subjects
related to censorship. Nevertheless, the suggested censorship type seems to be fair
from European Morality and reputedly pushes society towards welfare and prosperity.
These subjective characteristics were selected to identify the "Harmful and Illegal
content blocking" censorship type and used to distinguish political and ideological
censorship as a different type. Otherwise, there is no much sense to identify political
and ideological censorship as a different type as it is mostly regulated by legislation
that might label any content as harmful and illegal from a censor perspective.
2.1.2 Political and ideological censorship
This censorship type inevitably connects with the suppression of fundamental free-
doms, such as freedom of expression, which is declared a fundamental human right
by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights [23] and recognized by numerous
international and states laws.
Arguably, the annual freedom on the Net report [24] by Freedom House delivers
the most comprehensive observations of this type of censorship. In 2020, the report
reveals that many states used the COVID-19 situation as an excuse for censorship
engagement and blocking independent websites. Alongside independent websites
blocking state officials and their affiliate supporters distributed disinformation to
distract citizens from ineffective political decisions. Another trend of 2020 is abusive
Surveillance for the benefit of public health. The report shows that in more than
30 countries, authorities are using the pandemic to establish mass surveillance in
partnership with communications providers and other companies.
Although disinformation and mass surveillance become notable features in 2020,
traditional political censorship cases also increased in their popularity. Critical and
independent discussions, especially on political, social, and religious topics, provoke
censorship measures against independent online platforms or particular persons.
These measures might include
– Permanent or temporary shutdown of access to social media and other online
resources
– Disconnection of the Internet or mobile networks
– Deployment of paid pro-government web commentators to manipulate online
discussions and to influence public opinion
– Imprisoning, arresting, or assassinating individuals for their online activities
For more than a decade, China remains the leader of this censorship type. Since
1998 the Chinese authorities have developed and maintained the globally recognized
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censorship platform knowns as the Great Firewall (GFW). Moreover, in 2020 China
has earnestly demonstrated leadership in mass surveillance thanks to the new machine
learning and AI technologies.
2.1.3 Commercial censorship
The previous two sections deal with blocking content as required by law. However,
there are two more common types of network resource blocking. The first type,
which is used extensively, relates to preventing and responding to network security
threats. For instance, most businesses put firewalls and Intrusion Detection Systems
(IDP) as a barrier to cybercriminals’ actions and malware infiltration. Furthermore,
many Internet Service Providers (ISPs) block malicious traffic originating from their
networks. This traffic often comes from compromised client’s devices such as webcams
and routers. Another example relates to email filtering, which is almost ubiquitous.
It includes blocking unwanted bulk messages (spam) and malicious letters, e.g.,
phishing messages.
The second type of blocking is a network usage regulation. In this case, the
blocking of content is driven by requirements for network utilization and workforce
time management rather than combating certain types of data. Notably, employers
frequently restrict their employees’ access to social media in the workplace. Internet
providers might block or allow access and regulate bandwidth to certain content
depending on the services purchased by the customer. This type of censorship is rarely
legislatively regulated, except for anti-competitive and net-neutrality rules. These
rules impose equal treatment for all Internet traffic and prevent traffic discrimination
by blocking or throttling [25].
2.2 Methods of online censorship
This section aims to observe online censorship methods regardless of their ethical,
legal, or social aspects. Every method is assessed from a technical perspective, the
type of data it can block, and an evaluation of possible negative implications of
its application, so-called collateral damage. Thus, the suggested division is based
on technological features only and not on the application practices by different
blocking actors. Since a censor might apply every method separately or engage them
simultaneously and combine with legislative measures to achieve better performance,
the non-technical division would complicate the analysis.
2.2.1 Content removal and cyber sovereignty
Before observing technical methods of network access restrictions, let us discuss
the most apparent blocking method - content removal. This method might be
considered a promising approach, as it does not require substantial technical efforts
and competence. However, the content removal method works well for centralized
networks but fails in the global environment. Since the decentralized nature of the
Internet challenges censors’ endeavors to control online content, the concept of cyber
sovereignty was adopted by several states.
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Cyber sovereignty might be defined as a state’s moving towards more closed
and centralized control of the regional part of the Internet. In practice, this move
might mean reestablishing government control over cross border gateways, as it was
in Russia in 2014 [26]. Such countries as Russia and Iran aim to build their local
versions of thoroughly supervised and independent national networks knowing as
"Sovereign Internet" and "National Intranet" accordingly[24].
From a technical perspective, to create a national version of the Internet, in
addition to full control of international traffic gateways, a local regulator should
establish the country’s own Domain Name System (DNS) root servers and procedures
for distribution of domain names and IP-addresses. Local DNS infrastructure and
IP distribution allow effectively cutting of a regional network and preventing global
connectivity.
Because of the apparent collateral damage connected with the global network cut
out, total cyber sovereignty is the last resort method. It might be used episodically
to isolate some regional network segments temporarily. However, in the modern
world, isolation equals stagnation and degradation; thus, this extremely effective
censorship method has shallow practical capabilities.
2.2.2 IP address blocking
IP-address is a 32 bits (IPv4 address) or a 128 bits (IPv6 address) number that
uniquely identifies a network device directly connected to the Internet. Groups of
IP-addresses known as subnets are coordinated and allocated by Internet Assigned
Numbers Authority (IANA). Both types of IP addresses are allocated in a tiered
fashion. Users get their IP addresses from Internet Service Providers (ISPs). ISPs get
their IP addresses or subnets from local, regional, or national Internet registries[27].
This hierarchical allocation scheme bounds IP addresses and geographical locations
together. Thus, a censor might disrupt connectivity with a specific country or region
by blocking subnets allocated to this territory.
Data transmitted over the Internet is divided into packets. Every packet contains
addressing fields with IP addresses of its destination and source. These addressing
fields might be used to block incoming or outgoing connections from or to particular
IP-addresses or subnets. A firewall is the most common way to implement such
filtering. In principle, firewalls are used by network administrators to monitor all
incoming and outgoing packets and block those which contain blacklisted IP addresses
or subnets.
Although a firewall can easily block a particular IP-address, this method can lead
to overblocking as many services share the same IP-address, i.e., websites at the same
hosting provider or a server behind Content Delivery Network (CDN). Furthermore,
the modern Internet’s dynamic nature in many cases allows fast IP address changing,
i.e., in the case of a cloud environment.
2.2.3 DNS manipulation
Domain Name Systems (DNS) is a hierarchical system responsible for a human-
readable domain name resolution into an IP address. When users connect to a
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particular website and enter the site’s domain name in the browser address bar, they
first initiate a DNS request that asks for the IP address corresponding to the site’s
domain name from users’ system default DNS servers. The default DNS servers
usually belong to the user’s ISP. Thus, ISP has full control over domain name
resolution and can provide incorrect DNS replies or no replies every time a user tries
to resolve a blocked site’s domain name.
Even if the user changes its default DNS servers, a censor might exploit an
unencrypted nature of DNS traffic to modify independent DNS responses in order to
return wrong or empty DNS replies. Since the censor typically does not differentiate
end-users DNS traffic and traffic between DNS servers, DNS replies modification can
lead to incorrect DNS entries for third-party DNS resolvers, thus cause collateral
damage. Such behavior is known as DNS spoofing or DNS cache poisoning[27].
2.2.4 Keyword filtering
With unencrypted traffic, such as HTTP, a censor can block communications based
on their content, for instance, by searching and isolating specific keywords in the
traffic flow. Upon detecting the blocked keyword, the communication might be
disrupted utilizing dynamic firewall rules or by TCP reset attacks[28]. Since more
than 90% of today’s web traffic is encrypted[29], this method lost its significance in
its original implementation.
However, the censor might force users to install a censor-issued trusted CA
certificate in their systems, thus gaining an ability to conduct traffic interception via
Man In The Middle (MiTM) attack[30]. This method works as described below. A
censor pretends to be a legitimate website and issues a bogus certificate with the
censor’s public key for this site. Under normal circumstances, the censor cannot
sign its forged certificate with any trusted third-party Certificate Authority (CA)
and cannot use the forged certificate as browsers will notify a user about the MiTM
attack. However, the censor can force users to install the censor’s root CA certificate
into their systems. Thus, the system will trust the censor’s bogus certificate. Using
this technique, the censor can imitate any website, intercept users’ traffic, alter the
website’s content, and apply keyword filtering to encrypted connections.
2.2.5 TLS filtering
Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol encrypts the content of a communication,
except the domain name of the requested resource, which is defined by the Server Name
Indication (SNI) filed in unencrypted client Hello message during TLS handshake
process[31]. As a censor can still observe the destination domain, it can disrupt
the TLS handshake or negotiation process, hence blocking the communication. The
newest TLS protocol version 1.3, which was introduced in 2018, added support for
encrypted SNI and seriously limited[32] the possibility of TLS filtering.
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2.2.6 Traffic types and protocol blocking
TCP or UDP port filtering is the most affordable method to block a particular
protocol. For instance, the traditional HTTP uses TCP port 80 and can be blocked
by preventing connections to this port using a firewall. Although web traffic can be
blocked in this way, the blocking might be avoided simply by port changing. For
this reason, a censor can utilize Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) as a more advanced
alternative to port filtering.
DPI blocking involves the installation of content filtering devices between the
end-user and the Internet, known as a Network Intrusion Prevention System (NIPS).
Such systems responsible for traffic patterns evaluation and isolation of keywords,
application types, or separate files. Effective DPI blocking requires pre-defined
signatures or trained machine learning algorithms. Such traffic features as protocol
keywords, packet sizes, bandwidth deviations, and file names can be used to produce
signatures and train machine learning algorithms.
In a few words, DPI operates the following way. As a first step, all the packets
coming from and to the supervised network interface (or wiretap) are collected
and generally represented as traffic flows using hash tables, then stored for further
processing. With the next step, the DPI engine examines the stored packets payloads
and traffic flows for recognizable patterns using regular expressions, finite automata,
or machine learning algorithms[33]. As a final step, traffic processing decisions can
be made automatically or manually based on performed DPI analysis.
DPI is effectively used to block specific applications and data exchange, such
as peer-to-peer file-sharing and Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP). However, this
type of blocking is computationally intensive; thus, it might be costly. Furthermore,
the vast number of network applications and the ubiquitous use of traffic encryption
challenge the DPI analysis and reduce its effectiveness, resulting in a high number of
false-positive and false-negative cases, which eventually lead to collateral damage.
2.2.7 BGP routing and network disruption
Internet backbone relies on a Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), a routing protocol
responsible for routing between Autonomous Systems (AS). A censor might disrupt
this global routing mechanism for its users by advertising wrong subnets or IP-
addresses. Thus, effectively block its users from reaching all or some destinations
outside their AS. This technique is known as BGP tampering, also sometimes
called null-routing. This method can block any number of destinations from single
IP-addresses to almost all available address spaces. Thus, it is highly effective as a
temporary network shutdown mechanism in a particular country or region. However,
it comes with severe collateral damage due to the obvious economic and social
consequences.
2.2.8 Bandwidth throttling
A censor might intentionally reduce the quality of service for different traffic types,
i.e., by slowing down the connection to particular websites or applications. Since this
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blocking method is challenging to prove and identify, users might search for an issue
with their Internet connections. Fortunately, the method’s effectiveness is limited
because the connection is not entirely restricted.
2.3 Circumvention solutions and strategies
This section collects the description of the most common circumvention strategies
used to thwart the censorship methods described above. The section also observes
the mitigating potential and a circumvention solution effectiveness against suggested
censorship methods, together with a general description and principles behind a
particular approach. As usual, suggested strategies can be combined to achieve
better circumvention potential. However, even separately, each mitigating solution
provides a substantial privacy and surveillance protection level if used correctly. All
solutions are divided into five categories based on generally accepted and currently
used classification by network professionals and researchers.
2.3.1 Secure DNS
Because of the unencrypted nature of conventional DNS protocol, changing user’s
default DNS servers is an essential task to maintain DNS queries’ privacy and security.
Anyone can use external DNS providers such as Cloudflare (1.1.1.1, 1.0.0.1) or Google
(8.8.8.8, 4.4.4.4) unless their IP-addresses are not blacklisted, but even in this case,
plenty of other options exist. Furthermore, it is vital to use an encrypted version of
the DNS protocol to avoid possible DNS spoofing attacks.
Currently, two versions of encrypted DNS are broadly recognized. These are DNS
over TLS (DoT)[34] and DNS Queries over HTTPS (DoH)[35]. Both protocols are
based on Transport Layers Security (TLS) and serve the same purpose of DNS traffic
encryption.
DoT encapsulates the original unencrypted DNS protocol into TLS traffic flow
and uses 853 TCP port, the same way as it was done for other legacy protocols such
as HTTP, IMAP, and SMTP. Usage of a separate port is the shortcoming of such
a straightforward approach as the port can be blocked by a firewall. Consequently,
the user might have to use the conventional version of DNS (TCP/UDP port 53),
allowing the censor to supervise DNS requests[36]. Such attacks have their own name,
SSL Downgrade or SSL Stripping attack.
The second version of encrypted DNS (DoH) is resistant to possible SSL Down-
grade attack as it uses HTTPS (TCP port 443) as a transport for DNS queries.
HTTPS makes DNS queries almost invisible as there is no known way to discover what
type of content is hiding inside HTTPS encryption. Furthermore, HTTPS allows
applications to use existing browser APIs to initiate DNS queries[36]. To summarize,
both versions of encrypted DNS combined with independent DNS resolvers thwart
DNS possible manipulations and protect users from possible DNS spoofing attacks.
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2.3.2 Proxies
A proxy generally might be considered an intermediate server between a client and a
destination, relaying incoming data from the client to the destination and vice versa.
Therefore, the traffic relaying might be used to bypass the blocking, as the client
does not connect directly to the destination.
The proxies classification includes HTTP(S), SOCKS, and encrypted proxies,
such as Shadowsocks. Proxy support is an internal feature of the HTTP protocol.
RFC 7230[37], related to HTTP1.1, describes proxy as a "message-forwarding agent"
that receive requests from a client and "satisfies those requests via translation through
the HTTP interface." RFC7230 also defines a CONNECT method that is used by a
client to establish a proxy tunnel. Otherwise, the HTTP proxy connection does not
differ much from the standard HTTP connection; thus, it is susceptible to the same
circumvention methods as HTTP. In addition, the HTTP proxy connection can be
secured over TLS the same way as it is used for HTTPS. The second version of
HTTP also supports the HTTP connection tunneling and uses the same CONNECT
method to establish a proxy tunnel over a single HTTP2.0 stream[38].
RFC1928[39] describes SOCKS protocol as a more general proxy protocol and,
in contrast with HTTP proxies, SOCK supports tunneling for arbitrary TCP or
UDP traffic. Although SOCKS supports authentication, it does not provide inherent
encryption for tunneling traffic. Therefore, the original implementation might be
easily blocked through DPI as the SOCKS protocol can be easily recognized in the
traffic flow. To overcome this flaw, some developers added encryption support for
their SOCKS implementation.
A notable example of encrypted SOCKS proxies is Shadowsocks[8]. It is a secure
SOCKS proxy software with Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD)
ciphers support. Such ciphers enable confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity for
SOCKS protocol and thwart censorship by encrypting the entire proxy tunnel.
Additionally, proxies might be divided into forward and reverse proxies. Forward
proxies provide tunneling service to a client and might be used to bypass censorship
and anonymize its identity by hiding the client’s IP-address. The reverse proxies
might be used to hide the identity of a server from a censor. They also serve load
balancing, caching, and compression purposes and usually used by CDN networks.
The circumvention software might hide censored connections with reverse proxies
using the so-called domain fronting technique[6].
2.3.3 Virtual Private Networks
Virtual Private Network (VPN) is another network tunneling mechanism that can
be used to bypass censorship. Unlike proxies, VPNs always provide integrity, au-
thentication, and confidentiality for the encapsulated traffic. Nowadays, dozens of
VPN protocols exist, and most of them can be used (to some extent) for censorship
circumvention purposes. Arguably, IPSec, OpenVPN, Wireguard, and SoftEther
represent the most notable VPN protocols. However, this list is neither exhaustive
nor concise enough to discuss all the items in this study. Thus, this section is limited
18
to a brief description of OpenVPN and Wireguard, the two most promising VPN
technologies in 2020.
OpenVPN protocol enables tunneling of IP packets or Ethernet frames over a
specific UDP or TCP port; in other words, OpenVPN encapsulates IP or Ethernet into
TCP or UDP protocol[40]. It uses a TLS-like approach for encryption, authentication,
and integrity. The first version of OpenVPN was introduced in 2001 and quickly
became popular as it was one of the few cross-platform and opensource VPN solutions
at those times. Initially, it was a simple point-to-point IP over UDP tunnel with
Blowfish cipher support and SHA1 HMAC authentication[41]. Later, OpenVPN
developers added the support for X.509 certificates, smart cards, and a two-factor
authentication mechanism. OpenVPN utilizes TUN/TAP virtual network interfaces to
route all traffic through a tunnel and does not require application-specific configuration
such as entering IP-address and port for proxy servers. Since OpenVPN supports full
encryption of TLS handshake using a pre-shared key (TLS crypt) to hide the TLS
negotiation from eavesdropping[42], it might be considered a censorship-resistant
protocol.
In contrast with OpenVPN, WireGuard is a relatively new protocol. It was
developed in 2015 and has already got its popularity thanks to the unprecedented
performance and implementation simplicity. Since the early beginning, WireGuard
uses state-of-the-art ChaCha20 and Poly1305 AEAD cryptography and encapsulates
IP packets into UDP[43]. Unlike OpenVPN and IKE, WireGuard does not care
about key distribution and uses an authentication model similar to SSH, i.e., client
and server authenticate each other with their own public keys[43]. WireGuard uses
its handshake implementation and does not rely on standard TLS. It was designed
not to respond to unauthenticated packets, thus gaining its resistance against service
discovery attacks. Unfortunately, the protocol’s handshake has numerous unique
features, i.e., the handshake happens every several minutes to provide keys rotation
for perfect forward secrecy. Thereby, the protocol handshake’s unique characteristics
facilitate DPI analysis and make it possible for an adversary to discover and suppress
WireGuard’s connections.
These two examples illustrate the importance of concealing protocol handshake
detail from DPI analysis. Despite being an excellent protocol, Wireguard fails to
hide its handshake negotiation from eavesdropping, hence fails to resist against DPI
blocking[44]. The DPI resistance, however, was not the intention of the developer.
A similar situation was with OpenVPN until the tls-crypt option, which provides
the additional layer of protocol encryption, was added in 2018 with OpenVPN 2.4
[45]. TLS-crypt made it possible to hide OpenVPN from DPI engines. This study’s
scope does not provide a chance to present a detailed analysis of how particular VPN
protocols stand against blocking. Nevertheless, the example of OpenVPN illustrates
the primary approach employed by developers to surpass blocking attempts. It must
be noted that feckless blocking of VPN protocols leads to severe collateral damage




This category includes such circumvention strategies as SSH and RDP tunnels. These
tunnels are based on SSH and RDP protocols, which are standards for secure access to
remote servers. SSH tunnels enable transportation of arbitrary traffic over a secured
SSH connection using port-forwarding to redirect any TCP port to a tunnel[46].
Thus, SSH tunneling provides an additional encryption layer, a VPN-like ability to
access internal services from outside networks, and a way to circumvent censorship
using a widely used and most popular remote access protocol. RDP tunnels follow
the same principle and might also be used to bypass censorship. Since the blocking of
SSH or RDP results in totally unacceptable consequences for most censors, SSH and
RDP throttling is the most obvious way to reduce the circumvention performance of
tunnels.
2.3.5 Specialized circumvention software and protocols
Increasing censorship capabilities challenged the traditional VPN and proxy proto-
cols and accelerated the development of dedicated anti-censorship solutions. Such
protocols as obfs4, Lampshade, MTProto, and obfuscated SSH were developed and
used in Tor, Lantern, Telegram, and Psiphon to provide desirable blocking resistance.
Obfs4[39] establishes an additional obfuscation layer for Tor bridges via Pluggable
Transport (PT) interface[47]. To use obfs4 transport, a user must know the obfs4
node unique ID and Curve25519 public key distributed in an out-of-band fashion.
To connect to the obfs4 node, a client initially sends its Curve25519 public key, some
random data, HMAC calculated over the server’s key, previously obtained unique
node ID, and one more HMAC with a timestamp[39]. The client’s public key is
encoded with Elligator[48] obfuscation to become indistinguishable from arbitrary
data. The obfs4 node only responds if the received HMACs are calculated based on
the node’s public key and ID. The obfs4 node does not respond if the client sends
incorrect HMACs and closes the TCP connection after a random period of delay[11].
MTProto[7] obfuscates Telegram connection to mitigate blocking in certain
countries. Similar to obfs4, the secret key is distributed in an out-of-band manner.
The key is derived from the hash of a random seed and then encrypts a particular
magic value. The server, upon decryption, expects to obtain the client’s magic value.
If it is not the case, the server takes no action and keeps the TCP connection[11]
forever.
Lampshade and obfuscated SSH exploit the similar approach of out-of-band
secret key distribution and not replying to invalid protocol messages[11]. This
approach delivers necessary resistance to DPI analysis and possible blocking as all
communications are encrypted and usually obfuscated starting from the first packet.
Although some protocol features, like connection reset delay, might still be used




This chapter describes online censorship and divides it into three major types: harmful
and Illegal content blocking, political and ideological censorship, and commercial
censorship. It provides valuable examples and distinctive characteristics of these
censorship types. The chapter further explains censorship methods from a technical
perspective and possible collateral damage connected with each blocking technique.
Eventually, the chapter summarizes the most notable mitigating solutions such as
proxies and VPNs and illustrates their mitigating potential.
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3 The Great Firewall
This chapter provides an in-depth observation of the Great Firewall of China and
underlines technologies behind its operations, such as a TCP reset engine and active
probing. Additionally, an overview of the Chinese segment of the Internet is provided
to show a general picture of nationwide blocking.
In 1996, the Chinese Ministry of Public Security initiated the "Golden Shield
Project" to establish a higher level of control of information sources. Control over
the Internet was one of the main goals of the project. This aim was addressed to
the emerging Great Firewall of China (GFW)[1] – a surveillance and censorship tool
that filters cross-boarding connections and blocked data restricted by the Ministry
of Public Security. Almost 15 years later, the GFW plays a crucial role in Chinese
Internet censorship by blocking access to numerous foreign websites, such as Facebook,
Google, and Wikipedia. Today, the firewall is a sophisticated yet ambiguous piece of
software because its internal mechanisms are hidden from research communities.
Many academic and civil activists have spent significant efforts in studying and
analyzing the firewall. Previous studies showed that the GFW employs a whole set
of censorship strategies, including passive on-path traffic inspection[49], TCP reset
attack[28, 49], BGP tampering[50, 51], DNS injection [52, 53, 54], TLS Server Name
Identifier (SNI) and Encrypted SNI (ESNI) filtering [5], active probing[4, 3, 2, 55],
Quality of Service (QoS) degradation [56], and machine learning [10, 57] in order
to recognize unwanted traffic patterns. This arsenal relates only to the technical
part of the GFW’s censorship, however legislative questions and self-censorship are
out-of-the-scopes in this study. The firewall functionality was divided into several
subsystems described further and illustrated by Figure 1.
Figure 1: The firewall capabilities.
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3.1 The overall architecture
In [52], the overall architecture and structure of the firewall were studied. The study
revealed the firewall’s node locations and their internal structure, the usage of load
balancing, and centralized management. The firewall was observed as a centrally
managed on-path Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) with DNS Injection,
and TCP reset capabilities. The GFW manager rules GFW nodes, which operate
in clusters and analyze connections coming through traffic exchange points. Thus,
nodes work not only at the network edge but within the inland part of the Chinese
Internet. Namely, nodes are responsible for traffic sanitization, and they are the
main executors of all previously mentioned filtering methods.
Figure 2: On-path nature of the GFW, overall architecture and nodes load balanc-
ing[52].
3.2 Firewall’s mechanics
The GFW utilizes almost all known censorship methods and some unique mechanics
such as active probing and ESNI filtering. The described mechanics, together with
hierarchical blocking infrastructure, implement most censorship methods from Chap-
ter 2 and can reliably block domain names, IP-addresses, and many circumvention
tools.
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3.2.1 Passive traffic inspection and TCP reset attack
It has been reported that the firewall operates as a passive on-path network intrusion
detection system (NIDS)[49]. Similar to other NIDS systems, the GFW passively
monitors traffic and disrupts unwanted connections by TCP reset attack[28, 49,
53]. TCP reset attack exploits the reset mechanism of TCP protocol. According to
RFC793, If a communicating party needs to reset a TCP connection, i.e., in case of
a wrong ACK field, it can send a packet with a reset (RST) flag. This feature of
TCP implementation is used by the GFW, which sends forged TCP reset packets
(RST type1 or RST/ACK type 2) to communicating parties with the intention of
connection termination. The firewall sends forged reset packets continuously for about
90 seconds[58]. Any SYN packet between endpoints triggers a forged RST/ACK
during this time interval, and any other packets trigger a forged RST reply[58].
Figure 3 demonstrates the ongoing TCP reset attacks.
Figure 3: The GFW’s TCP reset attack [58].
Since the GFW is an on-path system , it passively monitors all cross-border
connections. It can inject additional packets into any traffic flow, but it cannot
prevent packets that are already in transit from reaching their destination. Unlike
traditional in-path firewall systems, this approach does not lead to a connection
slow down and allows monitoring much more traffic with less computation power
consumption. Figure 2 additionally demonstrates the on-path nature of the GFW.
In 2009, Weaver [28] developed an efficient detector for forged TCP reset packets
exploiting the race conditions that out-of-band RST injectors fundamentally face.
Furthermore, due to its on-path nature, the firewall cannot directly manipulate
traffic, thus cannot prevent packets that are already in transit from reaching their
destination. Both Inability to block connections immediately and Weaver’s detector
made it theoretically possible to bypass the firewall censorship by rejecting forget




BGP tampering, also known as BGP hijacking or null routing, is used by the firewall
for IP address blocking. It is a straightforward, lightweight, yet extremely efficient
filtering method that utilizes BGP routing properties. Thus, the method might only
be used by organizations with an Autonomous System (AS) status.
According to RFC1930 [59], an Autonomous System is a connected group of
one or more IP prefixes run by one or more network operators with a single and
clearly defined routing policy. . When an adversary AS advertises a route to a
subnet that it does not manage, that advertisement, if not filtered, can be propagated
and be inserted into the routing tables of BGP routers over the Internet. Until
someone detects and corrects the routes, traffic to this subnet will be forwarded to
the adversary AS. To perform a successful hijack, the adversary must advertise either
a more specific route using a smaller IP prefix than a legitimate AS announcement or
announce a shorter route than legitimate AS. Furthermore, full control over the BGP
operations must be achieved to announce BGP routes and utilizes BGP hijacking. It
is not an issue, however, for nationwide network operators and governments.
The GFW peers with border routers of all Chinese ISPs and injects blacklisted
IP addresses into their BGP routing tables, thus null-routing or hijacking all traffic
coming to blacklisted destinations [51, 50]. Although null-routing affects only outgoing
traffic, it disrupts cross-border communication by breaking the three-way handshake
procedure.
BGP tampering effectively blocks blacklisted IP-addresses. However, the effec-
tiveness highly depends on the blacklist’s accuracy and completeness. The blacklist
should be continuously maintained and updated. Furthermore, the spread of cloud
technologies reduces the efficiency of this method, as the IP-address can now be
changed in a few seconds. Another limitation is the possible collateral damage;
the IP-address blocking might disrupt innocent resources if they share the same IP
address with the filtering target. Thus, together with BGP tampering, the firewall
uses more sophisticated censorship techniques.
3.2.3 DNS injection
In 2002, it was spotted that the GFW started to inject DNS responses [60]. The GFW
uses a well-known technique of DNS injection to restrict the number of available web
sites. Many studies [52, 54, 53], have shown that the filter injects forged DNS in
replies to DNS queries containing prohibited domain names and keywords. Injection
happens regardless of a DNS request type; both iterative and recursive DNS requests
are replied with forged records. Additionally, the firewall does not differ request
to/from recursive resolvers (cache servers), Authoritative name servers, TLD Servers,
and Root DNS servers. A request is blocked if it contains a prohibited domain name
or keyword.
Fortunately, such projects as hikinggfw.org and greatfire.org constantly monitor
firewall’s censorship and compile a list of blocked domain names and websites.
According to greatfire.org, in October 2020, 155 of 1000 Alexa top sites are blocked in
China, including google.com, youtybe.com, facebook.com, Wikipedia.org, reddit.com,
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and many others. Moreover, the total numbers of 14495 keywords and 35332 domains
have been reported to be censored by the GFW in 2014 [52]. At time of this writing
(October 2020), the firewall blocks 981352 domains and 3086 keywords [61]. A recent
study [54] about censorship among Alexa top million domains has revealed a 2.8%
increase of censored domains over nine months from September 2019 to May 2020.
Moreover, it has been reported that every 1 of 23 DNS request is forged [54].
Unfortunately, Chinese DNS injection applies not only to Chinese users but
sometimes influences global communications. In [52], it was shown that the injection
method also works for third-party DNS resolvers from outside China, as the firewall
always reacts to all queries originated from the country. Moreover, [53] showed
that injections are triggered both by inbound and outbound traffic, which results in
collateral damage due to the poisoning of the DNS cache of innocent DNS resolvers.
Sparks [53] demonstrated that such factors as iterative queries type, name servers
hierarchy, server distributions, dynamic, and anycast routing might cause DNS
requests to transit via censored network even when both communication parties are
outside the network border.
The Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) seems to be a promis-
ing mitigating solution. However, the slow adoption rate of new internet technologies,
i.e., no deployment of IPv6 in China, still provides much space for DNS tampering.
3.2.4 TLS SNI and ESNI filtering
Historically, the GFW performed HTTP requests filtering based on a pre-defined
keywords list [1, 62]. Nevertheless, the spread of SSL/TLS HTTP (HTTPS) stopped
this practice as web traffic is generally encrypted nowadays. Since TLS provides
authentication and encryption, web traffic cannot be read or tampered by a censor.
Although TLS protects the content of transmissions, it does not hide a destination
party. The destination host is defined by Server Name Indication (SNI) field in a
TLS handshake. Chinese censor has used this filed to perform HTTPS censorship
and prevent users from reaching blocked web sites [32].
In response to SNI filtering, the Encrypted SNI was proposed for TLS 1.3 in
order to thwart the TLS censorship. However, ESNI introduction triggered a new
arms race round among censorship and circumvention technologies. Chinese censor’s
reply to the introduction of TLS 1.3 encrypted ESNI was straightforward. The GFW
started to block ESNI capable connections in July 2020 [63]. Later this finding was
confirmed in [5], together with some technical insights such as blocking mechanism
details and blocking duration.
3.2.5 Active probing
Active probing is a simple but yet powerful method of circumvention server identifica-
tion that is widely used by the firewall[4, 3, 55, 2]. The GFW engages active probing
when it cannot reliably identify the connection type and prove that it is used to
bypass censorship and associated with a hidden proxy or VPN protocol. In such an
ambiguous situation, the firewall sends a probe, an artificial handshake request, to a
suspicious server. The GFW may confirm the circumvention nature of the server by
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observing the server reply to the probe request. If the server response corresponds
to a known circumvention tool, all further communication attempts are blocked.
Typically, active probing operates like a reactive network scanner triggered by
ambiguous traffic inspection. The GFW may perform proactive and idle probing;
however, there is no clear evidence of idle probing. It has been shown that probing
is successfully used against Tor, SoftEther, Obfs2, and Obfs3 protocols and proxies
that provide access to the Google app engine using domain fronting[6].More detailed
observations of probing activity against Tor network are provided in the corresponding
chapter.
Figure 4: Active probing process.
3.2.6 QoS degradation
There are not many scientific articles about circumvention connections QoS degra-
dation by the GFW. Nevertheless, some clear evidence of such firewall behavior is
presented. Bevand [64] revealed that the firewall slows down SSH SOCKS tunnels
and induces the packet loss around 70-80% after several minutes of the tunnel being
actively used. He also noted the same problem for Polipo web proxy and proxy over
TLS connections. In addition, he proves that the GFW uses side-channel leaks [65]
in TLS, for example, by observing packet sizes.
3.2.7 Machine learning
Although there is no direct evidence of machine learning usage by the GFW, it makes
sense that the GFW staff utilize machine learning and train traffic classification
models based on actual circumvention tools setups. Thus, the firewall knows the
characteristics of different circumvention protocols and can identify them automati-
cally. The vast number of traffic classification studies by Chinese authors indirectly
supports this claim [66, 67, 68, 57, 69]. Since the internal mechanisms of the firewall
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are hidden, it is challenging to precisely estimate to what extent the GFW uses
machine learning and traffic classification algorithms.
3.3 The Chinese Internet
Even if the firewall appears to be a single entity, its components and subsystems
are distributed across major Chinese ISPs and operate independently from each
other, sharing common blacklist data and software[49].It happens because of the
Chinese ISP market’s remarkable characteristic, where the state owns all routers,
and most ISPs rent bandwidth from government-owned China Telecom. Historically,
the Chinese Internet included only four major nationwide ISPs, specifically CSTNET,
China telecom, CERNET, and CHINAGBN. Nowadays, six additional nationwide
providers are operated[70], including:




– China Radio and Television Network Co
– CITIC Networks Co.
A small number of ISPs show that the Chinese Internet is highly centralized with
no space for fair competition. The biggest providers, such as China Telecom and
China Unicom, act as a monopoly. They dictate conditions to smaller operators,
establish protecting interconnection prices, thus preventing small operators from
being profitable[71].
Current interconnection agreements lead the dominant operators to have more
market power than competitors. Small operators cannot compete with China Telecom
and China Unicom and often run out of business [72]. Hower, July 1, 2020, the
Chinese government turned toward a fair interconnection market settlement and
introduced a new regulation that aimed to discontinue protecting interconnecting
practices[70]. The new regulation supports mobile operators, especially China Mobile,
the most prominent Chinese operator with 180 million users.
China and the rest of the world are connected via ten traffic exchange points
and communicate through a limited number of submarine cables. In 2015, there
were only three traffic exchange points (Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou) connected to
the global Internet[70]. Since 2015, seven new exchange points have been added in
Chengdu, Wuhan, Xi’an, Shenyang, Nanjing, Chongqing, and Zhenzhou. These were
national level exchange points before, and they were promoted to international traffic
gateways[70]. Nevertheless, ten internet exchange points appear to be insufficient for
a country with more than a billion citizens.
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Figure 5: Chinese global Internet gateways in 2015 [70].
Since the state owns all Tier 1 infrastructure, the most sophisticated and the final
filtering happens on the Tier 1 level. Moreover, the first filtering level (Tier 2 opera-
tors) mostly responsible for DNS censorship and HTTP(S) traffic purification[58].
The network complexity grows with the increase of international traffic exchange
points and the encouragement of competition. This growth challenges the Chinese
censor and makes demands for blocking technologies described above.
3.4 Summary
This chapter observes seven known blocking mechanics of the GFW:
– Passive traffic inspection and TCP reset attack
– BGP tampering
– DNS injection




It describes how the firewall utilizes every particular mechanic to block different
content types and demonstrates the principles behind their realizations. Additionally,
the overview of the firewall’s overall tiered architecture is provided, revealing the
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firewall’s on-patch nature and load balancing scheme. Finally, the Chinese Internet
is observed to provide a broader view of the national telecom market and show how
its structure facilitates censor’s task.
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4 The Tor anonymity network
Since the introduction of the GFW, Chinese users have sought a reliable way to
bypass internet filters. In the 2010s, the Tor anonymity network was one of the most
popular ways to circumvent the GFW. Unfortunately, Tor was rapidly blocked soon
after the censor realized its circumvention potential. Thus, a continuous arm-race
between Tor and the GFW began. Tor is a second-generation onion router anonymity
network introduced by Dingledine et al. in 2003 [73]. Unlike the initial onion routing
concept, Tor was practically oriented. From the very beginning, it supported features
crucial for production implementation, including perfect forward secrecy, congestion
control, directory servers, integrity checking, configurable exit policies, and practical
design for hidden services via rendezvous points.
4.1 The overall architecture
The Tor network consists of onion routers (OR) or Tor nodes run by volunteers.
In addition, every user runs an onion proxy (OP), which is necessary for end-user
connections. Every Tor node is connected to all other Tor nodes, thus creating
an overlay network over the Internet. By contrast, a Tor proxy is responsible for
obtaining a network consensus from a Tor directory, building circuits across the Tor
mesh, and acting as a SOCKS proxy for client applications. Such an application
is most commonly a Tor browser, a specially constructed version of an anonymous
browser based on Firefox, but it can be any other application with SOCKS proxy
capabilities.
Building a circuit between Tor nodes is crucial to provide anonymity to users.
Every circuit is an established connection path across onion routers. At least three
routers are necessary to construct a circuit. The exterior router is called the exit
relay or exit node, the intermediate router is termed the relay node, and the closest
to a client router is known as the guard node. With each node in a circuit, the OP
negotiates a symmetric key using a combination of RSA and AES encryptions[74].
As soon as the circuit across the Tor network has been established and the keys
have been negotiated, the OP divides traffic into fixed-size cells and then encrypts
the payload and the header using the exit node key. Next, it adds a new header with
the exit node as a destination and then re-encrypts the payload and the header using
the relay node key. After this, it adds a new header with a relay node as a destination,
once again encrypts the payload and header with the guard node key, and adds the
final header with the guar node address as a destination. Thus, an initial payload
and a header are encapsulated three times and ready to travel across the circuit.
While traveling through a node, the corresponding cell header is decrypted, so every
node knows where to send it further. However, the full path is known only to the
OP, whereas the OR knows only its neighbors within a circuit, thus achieving the
necessary level of privacy. Figure 6 illustrates the process in detail.
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Figure 6: The Tor network components, a circuit establishment, and an encapsulated
payload encryption.
4.2 How the GFW blocks conventional Tor
The original onion routing concept used a flooded update mechanism, similar to link-
state routing, to inform mesh participants about all network nodes. Unfortunately,
for the sake of simplicity, Tor developers decided to discontinue this practice. Instead,
they introduced a centralized directory authority which consists of a small number
of trusted routers. These routers trace changes in node states and mesh topology,
i.e., the number of routers, their status, and adjacencies. Each of the ten directory
servers operates as a web server and provides network state data and a network node
list to the OP (clients) upon their request[73].
Moreover, the IP addresses of the directory servers are constant and hardcoded
into the software (OP). Since directory servers are open and available for anybody,
an adversary can disrupt regular Tor operation by filtering access to directory
authority servers. Moreover, nothing prevents it from obtaining full network topology
information, including the IP addresses of all Tor nodes. The next chapter provides
additional evidence that all Tor directory servers are unavailable from within China
as well as most vanilla Tor nodes.
4.3 Tor bridges for censorship resistance
It was reported that the GFW started to block the Tor Project website in 2008 [75],
and by 2010 the filtering was established for a complete network [76]. Consequently,
the Tor Project introduced Tor bridges, a new type of OR whose IP addresses
are private, as their data are not available through the public directory authority.
Bridges became the private nodes of the Tor network, and their primary purpose is
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to bypass censorship. Furthermore, they provide the same privacy protection against
surveillance and traffic monitoring as regular Tor nodes.
4.4 Active probing and Tor
In 2011, right after their first usage from inside China, the first reports emerged that
the GFW had begun blocking unpublished Tor bridges [77]. Eventually, the situation
attracted the attention of the Tor Project developers and the research community.
Later that year, Wilde [55] was the first who reported the dynamic nature of the
new blocking method and performed an analysis of the blocking mechanism. He
showed that the SSL ClientHello message, which is sent from a client in China to
any Tor bridge outside China, triggers a new Tor handshake connection, a probe
connection, to the Tor bridge from an unknown Chinese host. Wilde noted that probe
connections arrived in 15-minute intervals after the first SSL ClientHello message.
In addition, he proposed a way to confuse the probing mechanism by modifying the
SSL ClienHello message. It was sufficient to change a list of available ciphers during
SSL negotiation in order to distract probing. Unfortunately, this strategy worked for
only a limited time and required constant changes to the Tor protocol specification.
Later observations by Winter and Lindskog [2] revealed that bridge blocking
occurs based on an IP:port tuple and not an entire IP address. They showed that
the GFW drops SYN/ACK packets arriving from the bridge to a client but not
TCP SYN packets from the client to the bridge. They demonstrated that blocking
is continuous as long as the firewall can probe the bridge; if it is unable to do so,
blocking is removed in 12 hours. Their study proved that Chinese domestic traffic is
not affected by Tor fingerprinting. They revealed scanner IP address distribution
and showed that half of all probes came from a single IP – 202.108.181.70, whereas
another half of the probes’ IP addresses were almost uniformly distributed. By
analyzing the difference in TTL, they proved that the GFW practices IP address
spoofing, i.e., temporarily borrows legitimate users’ IP addresses and uses them as
probing sources. In addition, their work confirmed Wilde’s findings of probing the
timing and scanning queues of connections. Finally, they suggested a circumvention
strategy based on packet fragmentation in order to complicate the task of traffic
analysis.
In 2015, Ensafi et .al [3] performed observations of GFW probing activities
by mining production web server (HTTP, SSH) application logs for a period of
2.5 years. In addition, they observed Chinese firewall interaction with a specially
constructed infrastructure of Tor bridges and clients in a controlled experiment.
Their analysis included an assessment of probing effectiveness against Tor bridges,
analysis of probing triggers and delays, probes sources analysis, identifying different
types of probes, and proposed fingerprinting technique in order to understand the
physical structure of the firewall probing subsystem. Active probing effectiveness
was reported to be about 98% against vanilla Tor bridges for connections from
China Unicom and around 88% for CERNET clients. The TLS ClientHello message
was confirmed to trigger the probing event; however, the 15-minute probing queue
suggested by Wilde[55] was discontinued. Probes were found to operate in real-time,
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i.e., arrive within one second of the triggering event. Filtering was confirmed to be
based on an IP:port pair. The Probes’ sources were proved to be almost always
unique, with only 5% of IP addresses used two or more times. The only outlier
was the above-mentioned 202.108.181.70, with 248 out of 16083 observable probes
connections. Although this value is significantly less than the observations made by
Winter and Lindskog [2]. Probes were categorized into five distinct types. Three
of these types were employed against Tor, obfs2, and obfs3 protocols, while others
targeted SoftEther and Google App Engine. It has been suggested that despite
probes’ IP address diversity, only a minor number of “independent processes” are
operating them. This conclusion originated from an analysis of TTL distribution,
MSS patterns, ISN numbers of SYN segments, source ports, and TCP timestamps.
The analysis revealed recognizable patterns among these values. That raised the
question of IP address spoofing employment by the GFW. Delayed port scanning of
probes IP addresses revealed that they generally belong to typical ISP clients.
In 2018, Dunna et al.[4] revisited past probing observations and suggested a simple
but effective circumvention technique. They confirmed that probing is triggered by a
Tor connection attempt and occurs on multiple ports, the port of Tor connection,
and standard ports such as HTTP. Unlike previous studies, the filtering mechanism
was found to block the entire IP address, but not an IP: port tuple. The blocking
duration was reported to be about 12 hours, the same value as it was in earlier
studies. Dunna et al. observed that most of the probing addresses appeared to be
uniformly distributed and rarely reused. They suggested a simple strategy of not
replying to probes as an effective way of mitigating probing attempts and preventing
a Tor bridge from being blocked.
4.5 Tor pluggable transports
Figure 7: Typical setup for obfs4 pluggable transport.
In 2011, the arms race between the Chinese censor and Tor continued to expand.
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As a result, Tor developers introduced support for pluggable transports (PT) to
accelerate the development of prospective anti-censorship solutions [77, 78, .] Plug-
gable transports act as a SOCKS proxy for Tor endpoint. Furthermore, the Tor
traffic flow between the bridge and the client is transformed by pluggable transports.
The traffic flow transformation allows to bypass censor’s detection and brings new
anti-censorship capabilities not only for Tor but other circumvention solutions, such
as Lantern and Psiphon. Figure 7 illustrates a typical PT setup.
Furthermore, the Tor project provided API and guidelines for potential PT
developers; thus, dozens of transports have been developed and included in the Tor
software bundle. However, many earlier versions of PT, such as obfs, obfs2, and
obfs3, were deprecated as the firewall discovered ways to detect them. Currently,
only obfs4 [79] and meek [6] are deployed in the Tor browser and recommended by
Tor. Meek was developed by David Fifield and applied the domain fronting technique
to obscure real destinations through third-party content delivery networks[6]. In
contrast, obfs4 does not relay flows to third party infrastructure but obfuscates Tor
traffic using Elligator elliptic-curve obfuscation [48] and ntor protocol [80] for one-way
authentication. The result is randomly distributed traffic flow.
4.6 Summary
The chapter reveals the full architecture of the Tor anonymity network, which
consist of: Onion Proxy, Tor directory authority, three different types of nodes, and
bridges. It was also shown how Tor constructs circuits across the nodes, maintains IP-
addresses anonymity, and facilitates censorship bypassing. The chapter demonstrates
a fundamental failure in Tor’s design, which leads to easy blocking of conventional
Tor by preventing access to directory authority servers. Further, it was discussed how
this flaw ends up in the arm-race between the Great Firewall and the Tor developers
and pushed the development of bridges and pluggable transports. In addition, the
entire section describes active probing, an ultimate reconnaissance mechanism that
the Chinese censor actively uses against Tor infrastructure.
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5 The Tor network reachability from mainland
China
Censorship circumvention would be impossible without an understanding of blocking
mechanics, which are employed by a censor. Therefore, this chapter provides details
regarding how the firewall blocks all essential parts of the Tor network, including
directory authority, guard relays, and bridges. The chapter aims to reveal what
happens during blocking and revisits, confirms, and complements the results of
previous observations[4, 3, 2, 55]. The goal is achieved by employing a series of
connectivity tests describes in the next section.
5.1 Testing Methodology
For every test, the setup includes three to five servers in mainland China called
vantage points. Chinese servers located in Tencent and Alibabcloud datacenters.
Earlier tests were conducted using two Alibabacloud servers in Bejing and Shanghai.
Three servers in Shanghai, Beijing, and Guangzhou from the Tencent data center
were used as main testing servers. A total of five testing points provide necessary
diversity in the server’s network and physical locations. All vantage points were
installed with Ubuntu 20.04 operation system with only one exception. Alibaba
server in Beijing used Windows Server 2019.
The circumvention infrastructure, such as Tor bridges and relays, was deployed
in the Amazon cloud server platform. Tor servers were placed in North Virginia,
Paris, and Seoul to cover the wider geographical areas. Similar to Chinese servers,
all circumvention servers worked under Ubuntu 20.04. Together with circumvention
servers, a separate Tor bridge server was deployed in France in August 2020. This
server was used to separate possible background scanning from the GFW and not
participate in any tests. In addition, an iperf3 [81] server was deployed in London to
facilitate bandwidth measurement.
The great advantage of cloud providers was an ability to change IP-addresses
whenever it was necessary, thus for every experiment; all servers were designated
with unique IP-addresses that were never reused. Furthermore, all firewalls were
turn off to avoid any hypothetical connectivity disruption.
The deployed servers were used to conduct five experiments. The first three tests
examined the availability of conventional Tor infrastructure. The first one examined
the reachability of Tor directory authority. The second test evaluated the accessibility
of Tor guard nodes. The third test demonstrated how fast the GFW blocks new
Tor nodes. Two last tests were dedicated to Tor bridges. Test number four was
about vanilla bridges. The fifth experiment was related to bridges with obfuscated
pluggable transport support, i.e., obfs4[79]. All details relevant to a particular test
setup are further described in corresponding sections.
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5.2 Availability of vanilla Tor infrastructure
This section is dedicated to the reachability of conventional Tor infrastructure,
consisting of public relays and the directory authority. To the date of this writing
(November 2020), the Tor network included about 6500 relays and ten official directory
authority servers [82]. Although, only about 3500 of 6500 nodes are capable of
handling Tor clients connections.
5.2.1 Reachability of Tor directory authority nodes
Initial onion routing proposals used in-band network status updates similar to con-
ventional routing protocols [73]. However, Tor designers decided to discontinue this
practice and instead implemented a centralized directory solution that relays on a
limited number of directory nodes. Currently, this number is 10. Tor directory au-
thority servers provide Tor network consensus information to all members. Moreover,
for a Tor client, the Inability to fetch network consensus data results in a permanent
network connectivity issue. It has been reported that Chinese censor exploits this
flaw and permanently blocks access to directory servers, thus preventing vanilla Tor
connectivity [2, 4].
The continuous ICMP ping and TCP SYN scanning were used to test the
reachability of directory authority servers from within mainland China using all five
vantage points. The test was conducted continuously for one hour and was performed
three times in September, October, and November 2020. To show that directory
authority servers were operational during the testing time, their availability was
additionally checked from a separate control server in London. As the test showed,
not a single ICMP or TCP SYN packet could reach authority servers from any
vantage point for every attempt. This result indicates that connectivity is blocked
on a per IP basis, probably with the BGP tampering technique. Table 1 illustrates
detailed ICMP connectivity between vantage points and authority servers.
Table 1: Availability of Tor authority nodes in mainland China.
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5.2.2 Accessibility of Guard nodes
Ordinary nodes might relay the Tor network consensus information. Thus, authority
servers blocking struggles to block the network entirely. Therefore, to complete
the blocking target, the censor needs to block all entry points to the Tor network,
i.e., all guard nodes. In order to test the availability of guard nodes, the complete
list of 3585 guard nodes was acquired from the Tor metrics service via the onionoo
protocol. Then the TCP SYN connection was sent to the published Tor port for
every node. Every node connectivity was checked from three vantage points in China
and the server in London to discard false-negative results if a measured node was
not responding due to shutdown status or global connectivity issue. The experiment
showed that most of the 3585 nodes are unavailable from China. Exhaustive values
are presented in Table 2. This result corresponds well with observations from earlier
studies[4, 3, 83]. Dunna et al.[4] demonstrated that only about 0.2% of Tor nodes are
reachable. The conducted experiment showed a similar percent of reachable nodes,
whereas most nodes are entirely blocked.
Table 2: Tor guard nodes availability.
5.2.3 Newly published relay blocking
A conventional Tor server was deployed in the Amazon AWS cloud to verify how long
it takes for the GFW to block a newly published relay. To better understand the
blocking mechanism, the connectivity between three vantage points in China and the
new relay was checked every minute with ICMP requests continuously for 96 hours.
As soon as the new server appeared in the public relay directory, it was blocked
in 60 minutes and became unavailable from all vantage points. Previous studies
showed that this interval used to be 10 minutes[4]. Apparently, the GFW enhanced
the interval by now. Stopping the Tor relay, which deletes it from the public relay
directory, did not immediately unblock the server. The server was blocked for more
than 96 hours additionally. However, during this time, no active probing scanners
were registered. Table 3 demonstrates the differences between the obtained results
and previous observations from 2018[4], 2015 [3], and 2012 [2].
5.3 Availability of Tor Bridges
Bridges introduction was a reply to the increasing censorship of vanilla Tor. As it
was mentioned in Chapter 4, bridges are hidden Tor nodes. To further increase their
anti-censorship capabilities, Tor developers introduced pluggable transport support.
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Table 3: Comparison of results from previous observations, in 2012 [2], in 2015[3],
and 2018[4]
Most pluggable transports, such as obfs4 or meek, transform the traffic flow between
a Tor client and a Tor bridge. Tor metrics showed that about 1800 bridges were
operating in November 2020.
5.3.1 Vanilla Bridges
This test aimed to examine the firewall’s reaction to the usage of unpublished Tor
bridges. This test setup included an Alibaba cloud server in Shanghai and a Tor
bridge in the Singapore region of Amazon AWS. The Tor client connectivity was
imitated with the Tor Connection Initiation Simulator (TCIS) developed by Winter
and Lindskog[2] and which was later used by Dunna et al. in their recent study of
Tor bridges blocking[4]. The test was conducted in the same way as it was done
in 2018 by Dunna et al., i.e., TCIS initiated the Tor connection to the server in
Singapore, where potential probing traffic was captured for all ports.
Analysis of the captured traffic revealed no sights of scanning activity from the
GFW. The bridge was accessible from China for 23 hours and was blocked after
this time interval. This result showed that the firewall discontinued the vanilla Tor
probing.
5.3.2 Bridges with obfs4 pluggable transport support
The setup for this experiment consists of three Tor bridges, i.e., circumvention servers,
and three Tor clients, i.e., vantage points. Bridges were located in Amazon AWS
datacenter in North American, European, and Asian regions. Tor clients were located
in Tencent data center in Shanghai, Beijing, and Guangzhou. Each circumvention
server was configured to act as a hidden obfuscated Tor bridge[84] with the support
of obfs4 pluggable transport [79]. Each client was configured as an obfuscated Tor
proxy with the support of obfs4. Additionally, a separate iperf3 server was configured
to provide random traffic generation and utilize all available bandwidth completely.
Each vantage point had an iperf3 client installed. All servers worked under Ubuntu
18.04 LTS, and all listening ports were randomly selected. Table 4 describes all
server’s characteristics.
The experiment was done in three simultaneous and independent pairs of endpoints.
Shanghai vantage server corresponded to North American Tor bridge, Beijing vantage
points were used together with European Tor bridge, and Guangzhou server was
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Table 4: Experiment endpoints.
tightened with Asian bridge. Figure 8 depicts the experimental setup for a single
pair of circumvention servers and vantage points.
Figure 8: Experiment setup.
The following goals were established for the experiment. The first target was
to show that the GFW can detect and disrupt randomly obfuscated circumvention
protocols such as obfs4. The second aim was to find evidence of active probing usage
against potential circumvention servers. The third goal was to collect and study the
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firewall’s scanning traffic and its characteristics. In addition, the final objective was
to Illuminate a potential trigger for active probing activity.
In order to achieve these objectives, the test began, simultaneously for all end-
points, with traffic capturing on both a vantage point and a circumvention server.
All traffic coming from/to obfs4 port, which was selected randomly, was collected.
Packets size, however, was truncated to 96 bytes to limit the volume of pcap files.
Then, the iperf3 bandwidth test was launched in reverse mode, i.e., from server to
client, via obfs4 proxy and Tor. The bandwidth test was stopped after 24 hours of
execution. At the same time, Chinese servers were halted. The traffic capturing was
continued for additional 24 hours in order to catch possible delay probes. Eventually,
the experiment was halted after 48 hours from its beginning.
Connections between vantage points and corresponding circumvention servers
were disrupted after about four hours of successful operation.
Table 5: Time for Tor obfs4 clients connectivity disruption.
In Figures 9-11, a rapid drop in packet rate indicates the moment of connec-
tivity disruption. Any further communication attempts between Chinese clients
and circumvention servers were constantly interrupted by the GFW. Iperf3 client
continuous connections attempt provided a constant packets rate of about 20 packets
per second.
Figure 9: Beijing Tor obfs4 client drop in packet rate as a result of a connectivity
disruption by the GFW.
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Figure 10: Guangzhou Tor obfs4 client drop in packet rate as a result of a connectivity
disruption by the GFW.
Figure 11: Shanghai Tor obfs4 client drop in packet rate as a result of a connectivity
disruption by the GFW.
Figure 12 shows that the connectivity was disrupted with TCP reset packets. Any
new connection attempts after the first interruption lead to connectivity disruption
by means of TCP RST attack.
Further analysis showed that almost every new connection attempt from a client
triggers probing activity. Moreover, the disruption of connectivity was correlated
with the beginning of probing activity. This behavior was similar for all client-server
pairs, as it is illustrated in Figure 14.
During the experiment, 960 unique probes were received by Tor bridges. American
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Figure 12: Forged TCP reset packets used to disrupt connectivity.
Figure 13: Probing activity against North America circumvention server logged for
48 hours.
circumvention server got 346 distinct probe sources. European server obtained 360
probe’s addresses. Asian server got 254 probe’s addresses. Chapter 6 provides a
comprehensive analysis of received probes. Table 6 provide summary of the test
result.
Table 6: Result summary.
5.4 Summary
All tests presented in this chapter were designed to clarify observations of the GFW
conducted in previous studies [4, 3, 85, 2, 55, 83]. Tests confirmed that all Tor
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Figure 14: Correlation between Shanghai client’s traffic received by North American
circumvention server (black) and active probing packets engaged by the GFW (red).
Directory authority servers are blocked on a per IP base. It was verified that almost
all guard nodes were also blocked with some minor exceptions. Furthermore, the
blocking interval for newly published relays was found to be shifted from 10 minutes
to 60 minutes. In contrast with earlier observations [4, 3, 2], the GFW continued to
block a newly published relay for days after the relay shutdown and did not engage
any active probing against the former relay. Another finding was the discontinue
of legacy probing against vanilla Tor triggered by Tor TLS 1.0-1.2 handshake. The
blocking method of vanilla Tor bridges has changed. Active probing started to
perform a supplementary role and not the main trigger of the blocking mechanism
as it was before.
Until recently, it was believed that obfs4 provides reliable protection again the
GFW’s censorship as the firewall cannot detect and block Tor bridges with obfs4
support [86]. Unfortunately, these tests proved that the GFW can detect and disrupt
connections obfuscated with obfs4 transport and that the firewall engages active
probing against obfs4 servers.
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6 Active probing
Active probing empowers the censor to clarify the otherwise ambiguous traffic and
established full control over it. Figure 4 illustrates the typical scheme of active
probing which was introduced in 2010 as a subsystem of the GFW. Experiments four
and five from Chapter 5 confirmed that the firewall still utilizes the active probing
technique, almost a decade after its introduction. These tests collected significant
data about recent firewall’s scanning activities. Analysis of the collected data together
with observations from earlier studies [4, 3, 2, 55] reveals the comprehensive picture
of active probing and its evolution over the past years. Thus, this chapter highlights
some previously unknown probing characteristics discovered during the previous
chapter’s tests and compares the legacy probing technique with recent observations.
6.1 Legacy probing
In 2011-2012, the probing was triggered by a unique list of ciphers used in the
Tor TLS handshake [55, 2]. After a cipher list vulnerability was fixed, the Tor
handshake’s distinctive TLS characteristics were used by the firewall to detect Tor.
All Tor version which used TLS 1.0 - 1.2 had unique handshake properties[47]. This
issue was partially solved after the implementation of TLS 1.3 protocol support.
However, even after the introduction of pluggable transports, the censor found a way
to detect obfs2 and obfs3 with active probing[3].
Legacy probing was triggered by unique characteristics of the Tor TLS1.0-1.2
handshake. In 2012, the censor maintained a scanning queue, as probes arrived in
15 minutes intervals [2]. In 2015, Ensafi et al.[3] showed that the scanning queue
was discontinued as probes started to arrive almost instantly after the Tor TLS
negotiation. In 2012 and 2015, blocking was reported to base on IP: port tuple[2, 3].
In 2018, Dunna et al.[4] showed that the blocking mechanism had been changed, as
the blocking was applied to the whole IP-address. Since 2015, probes were uniformly
distributed with IP-addresses 202.108.181.70, and 111.202.242.93 were the most
common sources of probes. The IP address 202.108.181.70 was disproportionately
involved in active probing (sending about 50% of all probes)[3].
6.2 Nowadays probing
After the introduction of TLS1.3 in 2018, the handshake characteristics were not
sufficiently distinct to trigger probing. Experiment 4 showed that the probing for
TLS1.0 – 1.2 was discontinued as the probing was no triggered by Tor Connector
Initiator Simulator by Winter and Linsock[2], which was used in previous studies [4,
3, 2]. TLS 1.3 handshake did not trigger scanning as well. Thus, either version of
Tor TLS handshake does not rigger probing anymore.
Furthermore, Experiment 5 detected 938 separate probe’s addresses. Surprisingly,
probing was used against a protocol with a random traffic flow which was design
in such a way that its traffic is indistinguishable from an arbitrary sequence [79,
48]. This behavior raises the question about what activates the probing action?
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It appears reasonable that entropy (randomness) of the traffic flow triggered the
probing. Presumably, the bandwidth utilization had some influence as well. This
conclusion seems reasonable as it is not common to encounter a randomly-distributed
traffic flow on the Internet.
Tests confirmed that the blocking applied to a complete IP address and not to IP:
port pair as it was in [3, 2]. No probing queues were detected; after the connection
was disrupted, probes arrived almost instantly after the new connectivity attempt.
In addition, the probe’s sources were uniformly distributed.
6.2.1 Analysis of probing sources
Test 4 attracted thousands of unique probes from 960 IP-addresses. Analysis of
probing sources revealed 916 IP addresses that were used only once and 22 IP addresses
that were employed twice. This result corresponds well with earlier studies that
showed that probes IP-addresses are rarely reused[4, 3]. In addition, no IP-address
correlation was registered between 1201 probe’s IP-addresses collected by Dunna et
al. and 960 probe’s addresses collected in this study. However, similarities between
probes originating subnets were discovered. Table 7 demostrates the distribution of
probes among Autonomous Systems. Figure 15 show the geographical distribution
of the probe’s sources.
Table 7: Probes distribution among Autonomous Systems.
Nmap scanning of some probes IP addresses revealed regular ISP customers
behind these addresses. The same result was snown in [3]. The previous most
common probe’s IP-addresses 202.108.181.70 and 111.202.242.93 were not detected.
Figure 16 reveals how often probes sources IP addresses are reused. All these indicate
the usage of temporary IP-address spoofing. The GFW shares active probing address
space with ordinary users and temporary leases addresses for the purposes of active
probing. The fact that no probes coming from sources outside China were ever
detected additionally supports this claim.
Table 8 summarizes probing studies from different years and compares them with
current observations.
6.2.2 Observing a single probe
A probe connection begins with a regular 3-way handshake following by a single
payload packet. After receiving the payload ACK, the probe party closes the TCP
connection using routine FIN, ACK sequence.
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Figure 15: Probe’s sources geolocations.
Figure 16: Only 22 out of 960 IP-addresses were used more than two times as probe
sources.
Test 5 revealed that occasionally probe payloads contain replays of traffic pre-
viously sent by vantage points. For example, the payload showed in Figure 18 was
received twice. This behavior indicates that the GFW uses previous packets replay
as an active probing payload. Conversely, this is not always the case. Sometimes
probing payloads look entirely random. As the payload was randomly generated, no
coincidence possible.
Figure 17: A probe connection in Wireshark.
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Table 8: Comparison of results from active probing studies in 2012 [2], 2015 [3], 2018
[4], and now 2020.
Figure 18: Payload that was sent from Shanghai vantage point at 20:57:41.
6.3 Mitigating active probing
When the probing was discovered for the first time, it was sufficient to change the list
of ciphers in the Tor TLS handshake to mitigate it. Unfortunately, the censor rapidly
adapted to this change. Moreover, the censor maintained constant monitoring and
employed new probing techniques in reply to the introduction of new versions of
Figure 19: Example of replay attack used by the firewall.
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Tor and obfuscating protocols [78]. As a result, the constant evolution of probing
significantly complicates the task of the probe’s identification. Since different types
of probes are used for different software versions and protocols, detecting every
single probe’s type is a tedious task. Although some earlier solutions tried to apply
this strategy to mitigate probing [55]. Later, two distinct approaches for probing
mitigating were used in different solutions. The first method is based on the filtering
of all probing requests. The second approach is based on the disruption of probing
triggering.
6.3.1 Filtering
The firewall decides to engage blocking based on the reply to the probing connection.
This simple fact makes it possible to avoid blocking by not replying to a probing.
However, it is necessary to identify either probing sources or the client’s address
in order to discard all probing traffic. Since probing identification is tedious and
unreliable, client identification is the only option. Current solutions, such as obfs4
and Shadowsocks, identify clients by distributing out-of-band delivered secret which
is used simultaneously for traffic encryption and probing identification. If the received
payload is not encrypted by a previously agreed secret it is filtered and treated as an
adversary action. Another method to identify legitimate clients utilizes a separate
signaling channel to inform the server-side about valid client’s addresses. Chapter 7
describes a solution that uses port knocking and Software Define Networks for this
purpose.
6.3.2 Disruption of probing triggering
Previously it was enough to spot and alter the traffic part, which triggers active
probing activity to mitigate it. Multiply changes were done in Tor TLS handshake
and obfuscation protocols to stop the scanner. Today, probing is engaged against the
random connections, which means randomness is a pattern that is evaluated by the
DPI engine of the GFW. Thus, changes in this pattern should thwart the detection.
Unfortunately, every new pattern can be recognized through machine learning. Thus,
constant polymorphism of traffic patterns is required to cheat the firewall’s machine
learning engine. In what shape and how the circumvention connection traffic should
be altered is yet to be discovered. It is a good topic for future studies. Most likely
some AI capabilities should be utilized for unpredictable circumvention traffic shaping.
To further speculate that could potentially lead to a battle of AI between a censor
and circumvention solution developers.
6.4 Summary
This chapter describes the characteristics of probing traffic captured during Chapter 5
tests. It reveals probe sources geolocation and their distribution among Autonomous
Systems. Additionally, the chapter compares the results of active probing studies in
2012, 2015, and 2018 with current observations and reveals the probing evolution.
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Current observations confirm that probes IP-addresses are rarely reused and validate
the IP-address spoofing for probes address space.
Section 6.2 reveals that nowadays, the TLS protocol handshake does not trigger
the scanning and that the scanning is triggered, presumably, by traffic randomness.
However, this hypothesis should find its confirmation in future studies. Section 6.2.2
revealed that sporadically probe payloads contain replays of traffic previously sent
by legitimate clients. This behavior proves that the active probing utilizes a replay
attack in the hope of improving circumvention software detectability. Thus, probes
classification looks like a good topic for future studies.
Finally, section 6.2 introduces two common tactics of probing mitigating. The
first tactic implies filtering or not responding to probing requests. This tactic is
employed for the solution presented in this study. The second tactic suggests the
disruption of probing triggering by protocol shaping in order to thwart probing
triggering.
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7 Bypassing the GFW
Every censorship circumvention system must deal with an advisory, which employs
passive and active analysis against selected circumvention strategy. With dynamic
analysis, a censor imitates legitimate clients to ensure the circumvention purposes of
the system. The GFW active probing against Tor bridges is a brilliant example of
this tactic. A circumvention solution that can recognized adversary actions among
legitimate users will benefit in performance and mitigating capabilities. Thus, this
chapter describes a solution to thwart the firewall’s active scanning, thus avoiding
blocking in case of ambiguous traffic inspection. Upcoming sections present the
threat model, suggested solution, and its effectiveness evaluation. Additionally, the
chapter clarifies the selection of software-defined networks (SDN) and port knocking
as a signaling channel for the suggested solution.
7.1 Threat model
The threat model contains five main components: the firewall (the censor), the
censored client, the circumvention server, the signaling channel, and censored des-
tinations. Mitigation is successful when the client connects to the circumvention
server, as the server provides access to the censored destinations. The client and the
circumvention server cooperate with each other; in particular, the client shares its
IP-address with the server via a signaling channel.
The firewall supervises a national network as wells as all traffic exchange points
with the global internet. The firewall can monitor all connections and traffic flows
across the national network and discard or permit any packets. Moreover, the
censor can actively interact with any communication endpoint, i.e., injects and
replay packets. The censored client resides within the network behind the firewall,
while the circumvention server and censored destinations locate beyond the censor’s
authority. The firewall prevents direct communications between the censored client
and destinations but allows connections to the circumvention server and the signaling
channel. All firewalls’ reconnaissance arsenal, such as traffic inspection and active
probing, might be engaged against circumvention and signaling connections.
The censor does not control the circumvention server, the client, the signaling
channel, and destinations. It cannot perform the man-in-the-middle attack due to
the encrypted nature of communication between the circumvention server and the
client. However, the signaling channel is susceptible to the man-in-the-middle attack.
The client has an out-of-band channel which it can use to obtain circumvention
software, port-knocking sequence, and cryptographic keys.
7.2 Mitigating solution
Mitigation of active scanning requires no actions from a circumvention server in
reply to the firewall’s probing requests. As a rule, such behavior hardcoded by the
developers of mitigating solutions, e.g., obfs4[79], Shadowsocks[8], and MTproto[7].
However, design flaws and implementation vulnerabilities often leave probing attacks
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opportunities, as it was with earlier versions of Shadowsocks[87] or predecessors of
obfs4[3]. Since most mitigating solutions operate custom application layer protocols,
probing protection is limited to their own sockets. The GFW, however, engages
scanning against multiply sockets and utilizes different probing types simultaneously[3,
4, 87].
In contrast, traffic engineering can deliver probing resistance to the whole circum-
vention server. SDN makes it possible to resist scanning attempts by discarding all
probe’s IP-addresses or exclusively permitting the client’s addresses. Since the firewall
rarely reuses probing IP addresses, probe’s IP-addresses discarding is challenging
to implement. Fortunately, it is possible to permit clients’ IP addresses if finding a
reliable way to notify a mitigating solution about IP-addresses used by clients.
Unfortunately, client-side IP-addresses tend to change dynamically, especially
nowadays when end-user devices connect to different network types during a day.
Therefore, the mitigating solution should be informed about the client’s IP-addresses
in case of a new connection attempt or during an event of the client’s IP-address
change.
Luckily, every IP packet contains addressing information regardless of higher
layers protocols. Thus, the port knocking technique[88] can be used for clients’
address ascertainment the same way it is used for port opening purposes. As a
precaution and for better undetectability, the port knocking signaling should be done
over a separate communication channel with the destination address differs from the
IP-address of the circumvention server. Thus, several payload-less packets of the
port knocking sequence that are occasionally sent via an independent channel are
complicated to spot and tight with a circumvention solution.
Figure 20: SND and port knocking setup for active probing circumvention.
Practical implementation of the suggested logic requires an SDN controller and
two SDN switches. The first switch acts as a firewall gateway to the circumvention
server, while the second switch waits for port-knocking signaling traffic from potential
clients. The SDN controller manages flow entries for SDN switches, allows access
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to the circumvention server behind switch 1 for legitimate clients, and discards any
scanning (probing) attempts from the GFW. Figure 20 depicts the principal solution
scheme. The proposed SDN setup implements the following logic:
1. By default, any data plane traffic that comes to SDN Switch 1 is discarded
regardless of the originating party; thus, limiting the possibility for the GFW
to discover the Tor bridge with possible background scanning.
2. To connect to the Tor bridge, the censored client should send a port-knocking
sequence to SDN Switch 2.
3. For SDN switch 2, the SDN controller keeps a history of incoming UDP packets
and maintains a mealy machine.
4. If the censored client sends the valid packet sequence within a reasonable time
interval to SDN switch 2, the SDN controller inserts flow entries that instruct
SDNSwitch 1 to redirect future censored clients’ traffic to the Tor bridge.
5. Starting from this point, the censored client might use the first SDN switch as
a gateway to the Tor bridge.
7.3 Practical implementation
The proposed SDN setup was deployed in the Amazon AWS datacenter using two
AWS EC2 instances installed with Open vSwitch[89] and a separate instance dedicated
for Ryu SDN controller[90]. An additional cloud server was configured as a Tor bridge
located in the stub network using Open vSwitch as a gateway.For the SDN controller,
the UDP port knocking logic was implemented. The controller keeps the history of
incoming UDP packets and maintains the Mealy machine depicted in figure 21.
Figure 21: The Mealy state machine for current port knocking implementation with
Ryu SDN controller
The state machine works as follows. All knocking packets should arrive in a
reasonable time interval (20 seconds with the current code) from the same IP-address
and in a predefined sequence(11,22,33,44). The first packet (UDP on port 11) initiates
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the port knocking sequence and changes the Mealy machine state to stage 1. The
upcoming packet (UDP port 22) should arrive in 20 seconds; otherwise, the machine
state goes back to default. The third and fourth packets follow the same logic.
Eventually, once the last state is reached, the necessary action is performed.
Figure 22: The traffic flow during the testing of the solution
Figure 22 shows the traffic flows between all components of the solution in practi-
cal implementation. First, the Tor client sent the port knocking packets sequence to
the SDN Switch 2. The sequence is easily predictable but works for testing purposes
because the GFW does not care much about tiny UDP payloadless packets. Linux
nc command was used to send the knocking sequence as follows.
nc -u 15.236.209.101 11
nc -u 15.236.209.101 22
nc -u 15.236.209.101 33
nc -u 15.236.209.101 44
After the last packet arrived, the SDN controller installed a new flow to the SDN
Switch 1. The new flow entry instructs the SDN Switch 1 to redirect all traffic coming
from the Tor client’s IP (49.232.219.29) to the Tor bridge obfs4 port and vice versa.
Thus, the Tor client might select an arbitrary port to connect.
The new flow entry has an idle timeout of 3600 seconds. If the Tor client does
not send any traffic in one hour, it should repeat the knocking sequence. The same
is to apply when the client’s IP-address has been changed. Since the flow entry had
been installed, the client started to send traffic to SDN Switch 1, and the traffic
was redirected to the Tor bridge. From this point, the firewall noted the substantial
arbitrary traffic flow and started scanning against SDN Switch 1. By default, SDN
Switch 1 dropped all firewall probes; thus, left the firewall in an uncertain state.
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7.4 Effectiveness evaluation
The iperf3 bandwidth test was executed to assess the solution effectiveness in the
same manner as in section 5.3.2. The test utilized all the available bandwidth and
worked in reverse mode, which is natural for a production environment, i.e., the
traffic flowed from the Tor bridge to the client. The test lasted for 86400 seconds (24
hours) and successfully delivered 2.38 Gbytes of data with an average speed of 236408
bits/sec. In contrast with the results obtained in Chapter 5, the iperf3 connectivity
was not disrupted. The traffic flow experienced nor interruptions neither TCP reset
attacks engagements. Figure 23 compares bandwidth testing data of the current
test with the data obtained in Chapter 5. On the chart, the black line represents
traffic flow for the solution testing, while the red line represents ipef3 data for raw
obfs4 test of Beijing’s client connectivity in section 5.3.2 of the fifth chapter, which
is depicted by Figure 9.
Figure 23: Iperf3 bandwidth comparison between the solution testing and iperf3
bandwidth for Beijing obfs4 connectivity test from section 5.3.2
Although the traffic flow was not blocked entirely, and the client retains its
connectivity through the entire experiments, the test demonstrated the usage of
throttling against the mitigating connection. Thus, the solution demonstrates its
effectiveness against active probing, but the overall circumvention performance
is limited due to the throttling used by the firewall to suppress the mass scale
circumvention. It additionally supports the conclusion made in Chapter 5 that




Although the solution demonstrates successful firewall penetration, several weaknesses
should be fixed in future versions. The first flaw caused by the replay attacks
vulnerability inherent to the traditional port knocking method[91]. With current
realization, the same port numbers are used for every client. Therefore, the censor
might bypass the scanning protection by intercepting and resending the knocking
sequence. The port knocking sequence must be unique not for every client but
for every particular signaling event in order to avoid possible replay attacks. The
necessary replay attack resistance can be achieved by utilizing One-Time Password
(OTP) with infinite nested hash chains[92] to generate as many unique knocking
sequences as required. Another option is to employ the source port knocking method
developed by Fakariah et .al[93].
This method twice reduces the number of knocking packets by utilizing source
port information in the verification process. For every knock, the destination port
and the source port become the meaningful fields. It does not compromise the
security as the brute force complexity(C) remains the same, C = 655354.
The second limitation comes from the detectability of UDP packets and the
possible blocking of the signaling channel by IP-address. Even if it is not an issue
in testing deployment, the mass scale application requires a way to guarantee the
resistance of the signaling channel. Such resistance might be achieved by increasing
the number of terminating points and utilizing a domain fronting[6] for the knocking
traffic. Domain fronting is expensive for mass-scale circumvention as the solution
maintainers must pay for third party Content Delivery Network (CDN) infrastructure.
However, CDN costs in case of a tiny amount of signaling traffic can be neglected.
The third problem is the bandwidth throttling of the data channel. Throttling
is a common issue in GFW’s circumvention. Such solutions as SSH tunnels and
Shadowsocks struggle from throttling. Most likely, it happens once the defined traffic
consumption threshold is reached, as, in this study, it occurred after about four
hours of full bandwidth utilization. However, further investigation is required to
understand the patterns behind throttling.
7.6 Summary
This chapter suggests the Great Firewall’s mitigating strategy based on traffic
engineering using SDN and port-knocking. It describes the threat model and practical
implementation of the suggested strategy, including mealy state machine and SDN
infrastructure details. As a consequence, the performance of the suggested solution
was compared with reference tests from section 5.3.2. Upon comparison, the solution
demonstrates successful circumvention and limited effectiveness. The effectiveness is
limited due to the firewall’s bandwidth throttling and the current implementation
flaws, such as replay attack vulnerability and the signaling channel’s detectability.
Finally, some ways to improve current implementation were suggested.
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8 Conclusion and discussion
In this work, numerous tests and observations were conducted to illuminate details
of the arms race between the Tor anonymity network and the Great Firewall. It
was shown that the firewall’s active probing or scanning still contributes to the
blocking decision. Furthermore, the study reveals that the scanning is not triggered
by Tor handshake anymore but rather by the random nature of traffic, although this
suggestion should be further investigated. Many previous probing characteristics were
confirmed, and some new notable features were found. Finally, the mitigating solution
was proposed based on software-defined networking and port knockin technologies.
The solution proved its effectiveness despite being limited by bandwidth throttling.
The list below enumerates all key findings and conclusions of the study.
• The Tor network was found to be still heavily suppressed in China. The tests
showed that 99.5%of Tor’s guard relays, including ten Tor directory authority
nodes, are entirely blocked.
• Analysis of 960 scanning sources confirms that probe’s IP-addresses are rarely
reused[3]; only 22 out of 960 IP were detected twice. Further Nmap scanning
confirmed that the firewall’s probing engine shares IP-address space with
ordinary users. It was also demonstrated that probing sources are evenly
distributed across the country (Figure 15) and that AS distribution remains
the same as in 2011.
• The comparison of modern scanning activity with probing observation form
2012, 2015, 2018 reveals the change in blocking duration for former Tor nodes
from 12 hours[2] to more than 96 hours. The newly introduced Tor public relay
was blocked in 60 minutes, and the server’s IP remained blocked for 96 hours
after the Tor service was shouted down. Previously it was 10 minutes and 12
hours[4]. This work shows that the GFW increased these timeouts.
• The pcap captures confirmed that the connectivity was disrupted with TCP
reset attack using forged TCP reset packets in the same way as observed
earlier[28].
• The solution testing showed that the firewall’s active probing or scanning still
contributes to the blocking decision. However, the test from section 5.3.1
showed that TCIS with traditional TLS 1.2 handshake does not trigger active
probing anymore; supposedly, the traffic randomness is the trigger.
• It was demonstrated that the GFW successfully engages blocking against obfs4
transport and suppress obfs4 connections in 3-4 hours. However, it might be
not only because of the obfs4 vulnerabilities but also because of obfs4 traffic
randomness nature. This issue requires further investigation. The solution
testing also demonstrated that 3-4 hours is the reaction time for actions against
randomly obfuscated circumvention connection.
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• Another key finding is the usage of user’s traffic payloads in payloads of some
probing packets. It indicates that the firewall’s probing engine utilizes user’s
packets replay for scanning activities.
The work suggests two ways to thwart active probing, triggering avoidance and
scanning request filtering. The last is used in the proposed mitigating solution.
The solution demonstrates how traffic engineering and port knocking can thwart
active probing and enhance connectivity for obfs4 at least for 24 hours. The solution
effectiveness was evaluated against random obfs4 traffic flow and appeared to be
sufficient to prevent the complete blocking of obfs4 connections. However, in the
current implementation, the solution is limited with port knocking packets replay
vulnerability and insecurity of the signaling channel. Fortunately, these flaws can be
resolved with OTP port knocking[92] and domain fronting[6].
This study does not provide an answer to the third limitation, bandwidth throt-
tling. The throttling was observed in all conducted tests and started after 3-4
hours of active (full bandwidth capacity) connection usage. Arguably, the throttling
was engaged because of the high bandwidth utilization for several hours. However,
there is no answer, whether all or only some traffic types invoke throttling and how
the throttling is used in general by Chinese censor. This topic seems like a good
opportunity for further studies.
Active probing triggering is another excellent topic, i.e., to what extent does
traffic randomness (shape) trigger scanning. How active probing and bandwidth
throttling are related to traffic patterns? Are there ways to alter the traffic shape to
thwart these two censorship techniques? Two central questions for future studies.
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